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DEFINITES AND FLOATING QUANTIFIERS (TOUS / ALL) 
 
Francis Corblin 
Université Paris-Sorbonne 
& Institut Jean Nicod (CNRS-EHESS-ENS) 
 
A typical property of definite NPs is that they can be modified by floating 
expressions with a strong quantificational flavour. Tous, in French, all in English are 
expressions of that kind, as exemplified in (1) and (2) : 
(1) The students are all asleep. 
(2) Les étudiants sont tous endormis. 
The combinability of these two kinds of expressions – definites and markers of 
universal quantification – raises difficulties for standard theories of definite NPs, 
since most of these theories take for granted that the meaning of definiteness 
involves some form of maximality. And this association between definiteness and 
maximality surfaces in very different and unrelated approaches, especially when 
plural definite NPs are taken into account. Hawkins (1978) for instance proposes a 
pragmatic approach to definiteness (including plural references) based on 
exhaustivity, and the very influential work of Link (1983) in formal semantics 
provides an analysis of definite reference as the maximal element of a lattice. 
There are at least three problems for these theories: 
1. Definiteness is seen in many analyses of natural languages as something 
very different from quantification, something that is related, instead, to 
indexicality and information sharing. 
2. There are many situations in which definiteness does not imply maximality, 
as exemplified in (3) : 
(3)  A: The students touched this freshly painted wall. 
 B:  Many of them? 
 C:  No, of course, but at least one did. 
3. It is difficult to explain that items implying maximality can combine with 
other lexical expressions which are commonly seen as expressing some 
form of universal quantification. 
None of these problems remains unnoticed, but, as far as  I know, most 
proposals put forward to solve them have their own difficulties. For space 
considerations this paper will not discuss these approaches at any length, but will 
instead sketch a new solution.  
In my view the existing literature focuses mainly on problems 2 and 3 above. 
Two main strategies have been attempted. Dowty's (1986) focus is on 3. What he 
tries to explain is that some predicates cannot combine with floating expressions like 
all, which he analyzes as a genuine first-order quantifier. Another line of approach is 
represented by Lasersohn (1999). In this approach the focus is on problem 2; it is 
seen as a special case of a more general problem having to do with the degree of 
precision of assertions in pragmatic contexts, a problem solved in terms of 
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"pragmatic halos". I think that the general issue addressed by Lasersohn is very 
important, but does not solve problems 2 and 3, which involve the relation between 
definiteness and quantification. Lasersohn makes a good point in showing that 
expressions like all and exactly can play the same pragmatic role, but the semantic 
basis of the association between definites and quantifier-like expressions remains to 
be properly dealt with. 
This is why the line I will follow in this paper is more in the spirit of Dowty's 
approach: I think it is important to explain why some predicates do not combine 
with floating quantifiers in order to understand the association when it is licensed. 
However, my proposal will try to avoid some problems encountered by Dowty's, and 
will try to relate a plausible non-quantificational theory of definiteness with the 
behaviour of definites and floating expressions. 
1. Definites as referring terms 
The basis of my analysis is that definite NPs are not quantifying expressions. They 
are referring terms, like proper names. I will not go into details, taking this as a 
working hypothesis. 
Definites are used for picking out individuals in an “interpretation domain” 
(Corblin 1987). The reason why they have something to do with maximality, in this 
respect, comes from the way they pick out their referents in such a domain : to this 
end, they use their descriptive content as the only selection criterion. It follows that 
they will pick out all the individuals which match their descriptive content in the 
domain. 
The only way open for non-exhaustivity (of reference) comes from the fact that 
interpretation domains are pragmatically delimited. When talking of the students, it 
might be the case that I mean the students in general, in France, at my University, in 
my class, or those mentioned in the previous discourse. An important point I will not 
discuss here is that interpretation domains are different from quantification domains 
for quantifiers. Both are pragmatically restricted in a dynamic way as discourse 
proceeds, but the two categories and processes are distinct. 
For the present purposes, it is enough to say that a plural definite NP will pick 
all the x’s matching its descriptive content in the relevant interpretation domain. 
All this is just a matter of reference, of what one means by saying the x’s, 
irrespective of what one says of them. In what follows, I will admit that it is possible 
to neutralize this variable. In other words, I will suppose that the reference of the x 
can be delimited without any imprecision. For instance it will be convenient, for 
testing the examples with the students up to now, to assume that the interpretation 
domain is perfectly clear : for instance, we are talking of the students in our joint 
programme, and there are twenty of them. Or I show someone a group of students 
and say: “Look at these twenty students. Is it true that these students touched the 
freshly painted wall?” 
2. Definites and individual predication 
If definites are referring terms, like proper names, they can saturate a predicate 
argument slot, and the resulting interpretation is that the individual denoted by the 
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definite NP is a satisfier of the predicate. Let us call this kind of predication an 
individual predication. 
(4)  La robe de Marie était rouge. 
 Marie's dress was red. 
Building on many classical studies on plurals, we shall assume that definite plural 
NPs can refer to a collection viewed as a single individual – a group – and can be the 
basis of an individual predication.   
But it is also possible to associate to the definite NP a quantifying expression as 
in (5) : 
(5)  La robe de Marie était entièrement (partiellement) rouge. 
 Marie's dress was entirely (partly) red. 
In this case a generalized quantifier takes the denotation of the referring expression 
as its restrictor, and states which proportion of this denotation verifies the predicate. 
Let us call this kind of predication a quantificational predication. 
The relation between the individual predication and the corresponding universal 
predication is not trivial, as shown by (6) : 
(6) La robe de Marie était rouge, mais pas entièrement.  
 Marie's dress was red, but not entirely. 
2.1. Individual predication and inferences to parts 
Many studies have shown that starting from an individual predication it is in general 
impossible to infer which proportion of the parts of the individual satisfies the 
predicate. It has been shown that it is the individual meaning of each predicate 
which specifies which inference is warranted. 
Consider for instance the verb toucher (to touch). It is part of its meaning that if 
an entity touches something, all we can infer for sure is that at least a part of the 
entity touches the thing in question. But consider the predicate être grand (to be 
large). It is part of the meaning of the predicate to be large that there is no inference 
from the satisfaction of the predicate by the individual to the satisfaction by any of 
its parts. 
Many typologies have been proposed for grouping predicates in a few relevant 
classes. See Carlson (1977), and many others (Dowty 1987,  Kamp & Roßdeutscher 
1992, Yoon 1996, Loebner 2000, Rotstein & Winter 2004). In what follows I shall 
make use of the typology used in Corblin (2008), a typology set up on the basis of 
these previous studies, which distinguishes: 
1.  Holistic predicates1 (a set of predicates including the “pure-cardinality” 
predicates of Dowty 1987, like to be numerous, but also many other 
predicates like to be tall) 
2.  Universal-most-parts predicates (“UMP” predicates for short) : to gather, to 
be red 
                                                       
1 See Brisson (2003), Comorovski (2003), and Comorovski & Nicaise (2004) for work focussing on such 
predicates. 
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3.  Existential predicates : to touch 
In this typology, holistic predicates have two distinctive properties : 
A) No inference to the parts is warranted on the basis of an individual 
predication. 
B) No combination with floating quantifiers is allowed. 
The B property is illustrated by (7)-(10) : 
(7) *Les étudiants étaient tous nombreux. 
 The students were all numerous. 
(8)  *La plupart des étudiants étaient nombreux. 
 Most students were numerous. 
(9)   *La cuisine était entièrement grande. 
 The kitchen was entirely large. 
(10)  *La majeure partie de la cuisine était grande. 
 The major part of the kitchen was large. 
To my knowledge, Dowty (1987) was the first to point out the link between 
these two phenomena, although he defined the relevant properties in a different way. 
Dowty's proposal holds that the floating quantifier all, seen as a distributive 
quantifier (first-order universal quantifier), is licit if it can be interpreted to mean 
that each individual in the set satisfies some property specified by the predicate itself 
(what he called sub-entailments). He defines a predicate like to be numerous as 
having no sub-entailment, which means that from knowing that a set is numerous, 
one cannot infer any property which any element of the set should satisfy. On the 
contrary, a predicate like to gather has sub-entailements: for a set of elements to 
gather, these elements must, say, move to some common point. 
In my definition of holistic predicates, it is standard entailment which is 
intended, not Dowty’s sub-entailment. I try to dispense with the notion of sub-
entailment, which raises problems of its own. 
In a nutshell, Dowty's view is that all in (7) is illicit because it would require 
distributing sub-entailments on every element of the set, which is impossible since 
the predicate has no sub-entailments. Like Dowty, I am convinced that the A and B 
property are related, but I think that the relation between them is different. 
What (7)-(10) show is that there is a class of predicates which cannot be used in 
quantificational predications, but only in individual predications. The reason why 
this is so is that holistic predicates refer to properties which are satisfied by an 
individual “taken in all of its parts”. The intuition behind this approach is that 
holistic predicates have a built-in quantificational restriction stipulating that the 
predicate holds of an individual iff all of its parts are taken into account. As a 
consequence no quantificational predication can distribute the property on the parts 
of an individual. I do not think that anything important for the present discussion 
hinges upon the way A and B are connected (for more details on holistic predicates, 
see Corblin (2008)). 
2.2. Collective predicates and the interpretation of all 
Another departure from Dowty's view is the analysis of all. In the present approach, 
all is analyzed as a generalized quantifier, and not as a first-order universal 
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quantifier. When combined with a reference to an individual (a plurality seen as a 
group), it means that all the parts of the individual are satisfiers of the predicate. The 
semantics of all is close to that of expressions like entirely when used with singular 
NPs. 
On this view, the combination of all with intrinsically "collective" predicates 
like to gather does not commit to the distribution of some property to any atomic 
element of the group. 
Let us assume that such predicates select pluralities as their arguments. Without 
a floating quantifier, we get an individual predication : 
(11)  The students gathered in the hall. 
The “parts” relevant for the inferences can only be pluralities. Suppose this predicate 
is defined as a UMP predicate. Then the inference associated with the individual 
predication is that most parts of the group of students satisfy gather. 
If a quantifier occurs, we get a quantificational predication : 
(12)  The students all gathered in the hall. 
What it means is that all the (plural) parts of the group of students satisfy gather. As 
required by the predicate, all the relevant parts are pluralities, at least pairs of 
individuals. An interesting question – one which remains open – is the way the 
relevant partitions are built. Although I will not discuss this point at any length, let 
us consider an example in order to show that this approach is on the right track. 
Take the French expression être de taille différente (to be different in size). 
There are good grounds for claiming that it is an existential predicate. Look for 
instance at the following set of characters : 
(13) a a a a a a 
For all speakers I asked, the following sentence is true : 
(14) Ces caractères sont de taille différente. 
 These characters are different in size. 
In other words, x’s sont de taille différente iff there is at least one pair y of x’s, such 
that y is a satisfier of be different in size. This inference can be grounded if one 
defines this predicate as an existential predicate. 
Now consider: 
(15)  Ces caractères sont tous de taille différente. 
These characters are all different in size. 
In our view, tous is a generalized quantifier, and means that any plural part of the set 
satisfies the predicate être de taille différente. An interesting consequence of this 
proposal is that (15) should not be true of (13), which is confirmed by all the 
speakers I asked. Only situations like (16) can satisfy (15), i.e. a situation in which 
any pair of individuals satisfies the predicate: 
(16)  a a a a a 
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This example illustrates two general points: 
1) A floating quantifier like all can be interpreted as a generalized quantifier over 
the parts of an individual which indicates that any part of this individual 
satisfies the predicate. It can combine with inherently plural predicates, and 
quantifies in that case on any plural part of the individual. But it cannot 
combine with holistic predicates, since such predicates are true only of an 
individual considered in all of its parts and warrant no inference to its sub-
parts. 
2) For existential predicates, there is a dramatic difference between the truth 
conditions of an individual predication and the truth conditions of a 
quantificational universal predication using all. This is not only true of 
inherently plural predicates, but also of other existential predicates like to 
touch, as we will see later. In contrast, UMP predicates will not give rise to 
a major meaning difference. If we are right to define gather as such a 
predicate, the only difference between (11) and (12) is that only (12) 
implies that any pair of students gathered, while (11) tolerates exceptions. 
3. Distributivity 
Although this assumption is not uncontroversial (see Bennett 1974, and Scha 1981, 
for instance), a widely accepted idea is that what precedes is not enough to deal with 
plural definite NPs: the common wisdom is that a special notion of "distributive" 
interpretation is needed for interpreting certain sentences involving plural definite 
NPs (see Roberts 1987, Link 1983, and many others). 
To do without this would amount, for instance, to assuming that: 
(17)  The students touched the wall. 
is an individual predication (a predication about a group), and that the lexical 
inferences associated with touch require that at least one member touched it, but 
admit that any member did (something equivalent to what is usually called a 
distributive interpretation). 
I shall not take this road, and like many others I will instead assume that 
something special must be added to generate a special kind of interpretation called 
distributive. 
The classical strategy for so doing is to postulate an invisible operator D (cf. 
Link) which is interpreted as a first-order quantifier over the set referred to by the 
definite NP. 
(18)  Les étudiantes sont enceintes 
 The students are pregnant 
∀ x ∈ {the female students referred to by les étudiantes} pregnant 
(x) 
Most authors think that this interpretation is due to an ambiguity of the predicate, 
not of the definite NP. In Corblin (2008) it is assumed that there is an ambiguity of 
the plural NP, which can be seen as referring to an individual (a group) or to a set of 
members. It is for this special “set” interpretation of the NP that the distributive 
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interpretation is open. I do not want to discuss this view here, but only to point out 
some weaknesses in the classical analysis. 
The classical analysis has to make three arbitrary claims: 
1. There is an invisible quantificational operator. 
2. This invisible operator shows up as an option for some predicates. 
3. This operator is a first-order universal quantifier. 
Moreover, this bunch of arbitrary claims does not seem to be needed anywhere else 
in the semantics. 
As an attempt to fix this, I have proposed in previous work (Corblin 2002, 
2008) the following line of explanation, which draws on Lewis’s analysis of 
conditionals with missing adverbs of quantification. 
A plural NP can be interpreted as an individual, i.e. a group. If it is then 
combined with a predicate, it gives rise to an individual predication. But it can also 
be interpreted as a mere set of individuals. In that case there is a type mismatch for 
individual predication, which is therefore not licensed. But a set can be interpreted 
as a restrictor (a set of cases), and a combination with a predicate will give rise to a 
generalized quantification. In the absence of an adverb of quantification, the 
interpretation will work as if a universal or quasi-universal adverb of quantification 
were present. 
Let us recall briefly the analysis of Lewis (1975). A sentence like (19): 
(19)  If it rains I take my umbrella. 
is seen by Lewis as a mere stylistic variant of (20): 
(20)  If it rains I always take my umbrella. 
In both cases, the if clause provides a set of cases, a restrictor, and the sentence 
asserts that in all of these cases, the then clause is true. An interesting aspect of this 
analysis, left undeveloped by Lewis, is that, even if there is no lexical expression of 
any lexical quantifier, there is a quantificational interpretation, and this 
interpretation is universal or almost universal. And between the interpretation of the 
version without any quantifier and the explicitly quantified version, we observe a 
kind of relation we have already noticed for definite references : 
(21)  – If it rains, I take my umbrella. 
 – Always? 
 – No. But in most cases I do. 
The Lewisian account of distributive interpretation does not raise the issues 
encountered by the traditional analysis: 
1.  What we need is needed elsewhere. 
2.  We need it only if there is no other way to build a predication. 
3.  The invisible quantifier is no more a first-order quantifier than the Lewisian 
invisible quantifier. 
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4.  Some shared properties of invisible quantifiers are useful for explaining the 
data, namely that an invisible quantifier is of the UMP kind, not of the 
“strictly universal” kind. 
Consider a strictly atomic predicate like “to be pregnant” combined with a 
plural subject as in (18). There is no way to consider an individual predication (with 
the female students, as a group, satisfying the property : pregnant (x)). The reason is 
that such “atomic predicates” have, as part of their meaning, a constraint that they 
cannot enter into an individual predication with a group. The only accessible 
interpretation, then, is that an invisible UMP quantifier distributes this property over 
the members of the set. In other words, the only way to interpret (18) is as a 
quantificational predication distributing over the atoms of the sets. This does not 
mean that all should be interpreted as a lexical realization of a first-order distributive 
quantifier. As in any use of all, it is interpreted as a generalized quantifier meaning 
that any part of the set referred to by the subject is a satisfier of the predicate. A 
property of atomic predicates is that only the partition into atoms is relevant. 
The contrast with sentences containing a lexical quantifier (all) is that in that 
case all of the students should be pregnant. A prediction of this analysis is that for 
inherently atomic predicates, i.e. predicates which cannot be attributed to pluralities, 
the contrast between bare definites and definites modified by all should not be 
dramatic, a prediction which is borne out. 
In my view, Lasersohn’s work on pragmatic halos could be useful for 
discussing the UMP interpretation of implicit operators. A strong intuition is that an 
invisible quantifier is interpreted as “universal up to the degree of precision tolerated 
by the ongoing activity”. 
For instance, when doing mathematics, an implicit principle of interpretation is 
that any such quantifiers are strictly universal, just because this kind of activity is 
exclusively concerned with strictly universal sentences. But of course this is 
different if one is talking about human behaviour. 
There is another story about invisible quantifiers (see Schwarzschild 1994, and 
for discussion Lasersohn 1995): that story says that the invisible quantifier is strictly 
universal, but that it comes with a permission to exclude some individuals from the 
domain of discourse (including some admissible cases for the restrictor). In other 
words, the students (without an explicit quantifier) would be interpreted as a 
universal quantifier not committed to taking into account every student of the 
discourse domain. Lasersohn (1995) points to some empirical problems with an 
unconstrained version of this approach. I would like to point out, in addition, some 
theoretical problems with this view. 
In a nutshell, we face the following alternative: considering a sentence that most 
views want to analyse as involving quantification without a quantifier, one approach 
assumes that the quantifier is strictly universal, but that the domain of quantification 
in not exhaustively quantified over; the other one assumes that the quantifier is 
universal or almost universal, and says nothing about the domain. It seems to me 
that the first approach has to make at least two assumptions (the quantifier is 
universal, and the domain is not maximal), whereas the second one does not appeal 
to restrictions on the domain and is restricted to surface manifestations: how are we 
to interpret a quantified sentence with no explicit quantifier? The answer “as a 
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universal-or-almost quantifier” has the advantage of preserving the rule that only all 
“means” universal quantification, and that a silent quantifier has a different meaning. 
Actually, the main problem for these approaches (see Brisson 2003 for a recent 
version) is the meaning of all. If the meaning of definiteness is universal 
quantification plus non-exhaustive domain, the meaning of all  is reduced to ruling 
out the non-exhaustive domain constraint. Then, all is, by and large, a slack 
regulator, in the sense of Lasersohn (1999). In my opinion, it is much more natural 
to stick to the idea that all means “all”, and to assume that an implicit universal 
quantification is less strict and means “all or almost”, even though the domain-
flexibility approach will produce extensionally the same result. 
4. Mixed predicates 
Some predicates, when combined with a plural subject, can be interpreted either as 
an individual predication (the group is a satisfier of the predicate) or as a 
quantificational (distributive) interpretation. Such predicates allow their argument to 
be a group, or to be an atom. 
Individual predication : 
(22)  Mes étudiants m'ont offert un présent. 
 My students gave me a present. 
If the subject is interpreted as referring to a group, there is only one quantifier in the 
sentence (corresponding to the indefinite), and at least (and preferably) one present 
has been given by the group.  
Quantificational predication : 
(23) Mes étudiants m'ont tous offert un présent. 
 My students all gave me a present. 
The most natural interpretation gives wide scope to the universal generalized 
quantifier over the existential quantifier. This is not equivalent to what is usually 
called a distributive interpretation, but is closer to the tentative paraphrase (24): 
(24) Each student was an agent of a giving-me-a-present action 
(individual or collective). 
It says that there is at least one partition of the group such that for any subpart p of 
this partition, p gives a present. With no exception, any student is a member of a 
group giving a present. 
The classical distributive interpretation is only a highly preferred interpretation 
for sentences like (23), and there is no way to interpret tous as the realization of the 
distributive operator, for a simple reason: there is a natural candidate for the 
realization, or for the selection of a strictly distributive (i.e. first order) quantifier, 
namely chacun, which is perfectly2 compatible with the occurrence of tous: 
                                                       
2 For some speakers (I am grateful to P. De Brabanter for this comment), the sentence is perceived, out of 
the blue, as involving a redundancy. A natural context of use would be, for instance, a dialogue like : 
- Mes étudiants m’ont fait un cadeau 
- Tu as donc reçu un cadeau ? 
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(25)  Mes étudiants m'ont tous offert un cadeau chacun. 
 My students all gave me a present each. 
The difference between (23) and (25) is that, if present, chacun implies that the 
predicate must be interpreted as an atomic predicate (applying only to atoms). In 
contrast, tous implies that any part of the subject is a satisfier. This is why (23) is 
equivalent neither to (25) nor to (26): 
(26)  Mes étudiants m'ont offert un cadeau chacun. 
 My students gave me a present each. 
In order to deal with the data and the combinatory possibilities, chacun should be 
analyzed as an argument modifier which transforms the host predicate into an 
atomic predicate interpreted in the scope of a quantifier over a plurality. It follows 
that the subject must be interpreted as referring to a set, and that the predication 
must quantify over atomic individuals. As usual, if present, the generalized 
quantifier all will imply that any part (in that case any individual in the set) is a 
satisfier of this individual predicate. If there is no lexical quantifier, the 
interpretation will as usual be a UMP quantifier. 
It has been said in passing that the presence of tous in a sentence makes the 
classical distributive interpretation highly preferred. Why is it so? I think that the 
presence of a quantifier makes salient the partition of the referent, and that the most 
salient partition of a plurality is into its atoms. This is probably why (23) is most 
often interpreted as meaning: “every student bought a present”. 
But there is a face-value problem with the collective interpretation (27) : 
(27) Mes étudiants m'ont tous offert cette sculpture de Dali 
 My students all gave me this sculpture by Dali. 
It is necessary to interpret this sentence with the meaning: all my students together 
presented me with this sculpture. The classical example of piano moving exhibits the 
same kind of phenomenon: 
(28)  Mes étudiants ont tous monté le piano à l'étage 
 My students all carried the piano upstairs. 
Although tous is present, the interpretation is a classical "collective" interpretation. 
A plus point of the present analysis is that tous does not impose a distributive 
interpretation, but only displays a preference for it. 
One may think, however, that this is a problem, because a simple way of 
accommodating collective interpretations, in our terms, is to see collective 
interpretations as individual predication. The collective interpretation of (29): 
(29)  Mes étudiants ont monté le piano à l'étage. 
 My students carried the piano upstairs. 
would be an individual predication: the students, as a group, satisfy the predicate. 
But our assumption is that the mere presence of a quantifier involves 
                                                                                                                                 
- Non. Ils m’ont tous fait un cadeau chacun. 
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quantificational predication, and implies that any part of the referent satisfies the 
predicate. 
The question is thus: how can we accommodate the fact that these sentences 
have a collective reading – i.e. one that normally requires individual predication – 
even though they contain a quantifier – the hallmark of quantification? 
The answer we would like to suggest is that these sentences are actually a 
special case of quantification. Suppose a, b, c, are working together to move the 
piano upstairs. Any of them, if asked “Did you carry the piano upstairs?” would 
probably answer: “Yes, but not alone”.  
Sentences like (28) can thus be interpreted as asserting that each atom satisfies 
the predicate, but this does not in general imply that the atom under consideration 
did it on its own, although such an implicature can be associated with the predicate. 
Consider (29): 
(29)  Les étudiants ont tous réglé l'addition. 
 The students all paid the bill. 
There is, of course a distributive interpretation, which would imply some sort of 
mistake: each student pays the bill on its own; in that case, the bill is paid many 
times. But there is also another distributive interpretation; each student, if asked, 
would say : “yes I paid the bill, but not alone”. It seems to me that the source of the 
ambiguity is not the predication, which is distributive, but the interpretation of the 
predicate. Note that we need to accommodate cases like (30), which are independent 
of the issues under discussion : 
(30) John a financé ce projet. 
 John funded the project. 
On one interpretation, John funded the whole project; on another one, John funded 
only a part of it: he was a contributor. In order to accommodate the ambiguity, it is 
necessary to allow a “take part in” operator as an alternative to the basic relation of 
satisfaction holding between the argument and the predicate. Whatever the correct 
solution to this problem, it will solve the problems arising with cases like (27)-(29) 
too.  
Both interpretations are distributive, and assert that any member of the group 
either satisfies the predicate, or takes part in the satisfaction. And the latter case, 
though close to a true “individual” (i.e. “collective interpretation”), is still different: 
the individual interpretation states that the group paid the bill, without saying 
anything about the behaviour of individual students; the distributive “take part in” 
interpretation asserts that the bill was paid, and that every student made a 
contribution. It is likely that the licensing of a “take part in” operator makes a 
difference between predicates. For some it is a natural option, for others it is rather 
odd. 
(31) Les étudiants ont planté cet arbre dans la cour. 
 The students planted this tree in the yard. 
(32)  Les étudiants ont planté ce clou dans le mur. 
 The students drove this nail into the wall. 
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The individual interpretation makes no difference. Both sentences are natural. 
But if tous is added, the present theory predicts a distributive “take part in” 
interpretation. 
(33)  Les étudiants ont tous planté cet arbre dans la cour 
(34)  Les étudiants ont tous planté ce clou dans le mur. 
(33) is perfectly fine, but (34) is odd. Just because, I think, driving a nail into a wall 
makes the “take part in” option odd, considering that this is typically something that 
a single individual does on his/her own. 
5. Summary and discussion. 
Let us sum up the proposal concerning plural definite NPs. For any kind of predicate 
(except strictly atomic ones, by definition) an individual interpretation is open for 
pluralities: the plurality satisfies the predicate. Depending on its lexical class 
(holistic, UMP, existential), a given predicate allows inferences as to the satisfaction 
of the predicate by the parts of the individual (respectively: no part, most parts, some 
parts). 
When combined with a floating all (tous) the interpretation is quantificational : 
it says that the predicate is satisfied by any part of a partition of the individual 
referred to by the definite NP. 
For inherently plural predicates (e.g. to gather), the quantifier indicates that any 
plural part of the partition satisfies the predicate. For mixed predicates (e.g. to buy), 
in any context, the presence of the generalized quantifier (all) triggers a 
quantificational distributive interpretation (quantification over the atoms). But due to 
the possible intervention of a “take part in” operator in the interpretation of the 
predicate, there are two distributive interpretations: strictly distributive (every 
individual satisfies the predicate), or pseudo-distributive (every individual takes part 
in the satisfaction). 
Quantificational interpretations can arise without any lexical quantifier. For 
atomic predicates, the distributive interpretation is the only accessible option: it is 
triggered by a silent generalized quantifier, sharing the properties of the Lewisian 
invisible adverb of quantification needed for the interpretation of conditionals. This 
quantifier is interpreted roughly as “universal or almost universal”. The proposal 
extends this possibility to mixed predicates. Even if no lexical quantifier is realized, 
the reference of the subject can be seen as a set of parts (typically atoms), quantified 
over by an invisible Lewisian generalized quantifier. This is a non-arbitrary way of 
getting the distributive interpretations, and their relation to strict universal 
quantification. 
One might think that this proposal will produce too many interpretations, 
precisely because it allows the intervention of a silent quasi-universal generalized 
quantifier with almost any predicate (with the exception of holistic predicates). For 
this reason, almost any occurrence of a definite NP will be ambiguous between and 
individual interpretation and a quantificational one relying on an invisible Lewisian 
quantifier. This criticism might be correct; note that it can also be made with respect 
to any proposal that appeals to an invisible D(istributive) operator. Given that the 
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present approach focuses on the different inferences licensed by different classes of 
predicates it will have a way of explaining why the postulated ambiguity is 
sometimes very visible, and sometimes rather invisible. Consider UMP predicates; 
there is, extensionally, no difference between the individual interpretation and the 
implicitly quantified one: both lead to the inference that all (or almost all) parts of 
the plurality are satisfiers. In the first case it is an implication, in the second one it is 
the meaning of the sentence. 
For a sentence like (35): 
(35)  The students are working in the library. 
Once it is admitted that work is a UMP predicate, there is no difference between 
asserting that the group denoted by the students is a satisfier and asserting that all or 
almost all students are satisfiers. The only difference concerns the way one looks at 
the students: as a group, or as a set of individuals. 
It is for existential predicates that the present approach predicts a relevant 
difference. 
(36)  Les étudiants ont fait un graffiti dans le hall. 
 The students made a scribble in the hall 
If the sentence is true when a single student made a single scribble, the predicate is 
existential. But of course, this sentence can be used for asserting that all (or almost 
all) of them made a scribble. And to generate this interpretation, a silent quantifier is 
needed. 
There are some differences between this proposal and classical approaches 
based on an invisible D operator. In the present approach, the silent (or explicit) 
quantifier is a generalized quantifier over the parts of the plural individual, not a 
first-order quantifier on the atoms. This makes the occurrence of tous/all with 
inherently plural predicates (to gather) something which needs no special 
explanation: the predicate is satisfied by any (plural) part of the collection. It seems 
to me that it is also a more natural explanation for interpretations which are neither 
strictly distributive nor collective, but just imply that all parts of x in a partition (not 
necessarily atoms) satisfy the predicate. This proposal, moreover, tries to make the 
invisible quantifier less arbitrary. It is seen as close to the invisible adverb of 
quantification used by Lewis for conditionals, and it is triggered by the 
representation of a referent as a set (of parts), not as a single individual. 
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